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ASSESSING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JURY




The medical malpractice tort system plays a major role in defining
the acceptable level of injury in health care delivered in the United
States.' Prevention and reduction of medical malpractice from this legal
perspective is predicated upon an ideal of deterrence. By punishing phy-
sicians for falling short of a pre-established socially optimal level of care,
the judicial system can theoretically induce physicians to practice
medicine at an acceptable and expected level of error.2 In other words,
by taking into account the relative costs and benefits of avoiding error,
the legal system should be able to provide an encompassing incentive
structure that induces physicians to prevent malpractice and reduce in-
jury to socially-acceptable, and implicitly, cost-effective and efficient
levels.3 Thus, the legal system should provide physicians with a power-
ful sense of duty to monitor their actions and to give the requisite level of
t Bryan A. Liang is Caruso Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Law, Pep-
perdine University School of Law, Malibu, California. B.S. 1983, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; Ph.D. 1989, University of Chicago; M.D. 1991, Columbia University College of
Physicians & Surgeons; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank David Cullen,
M.D., M.S. for his support, encouragement, and assistance; Greg Sisk, Ray Buchanan, Shan-
non M. Biggs, and Tom Bergin for insightful comments; and, of course, the participating
physicians and nonphysicians for their time and patience in completing this study. Finally,
thanks to Melinda L. McElroy for her assistance in editing this manuscript. An abstract of an
earlier draft of this paper was electronically published on the Law and Economics Abstracts
listserv, No. 19, Aug. 8, 1996. In addition, the results of this study were presented at the
Examining Errors in Health Care Conference, Oct. 13-15, 1996, Rancho Mirage, California,
and, in a slightly different form, at the Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corporation, May 19,
1997, Santa Monica, California. I would like to thank these audiences for their comments and
suggestions on the study.
1 "[Mjedical malpractice litigation rates in the United States are the highest in the world
.John D. Blum, Introduction: Comparative Health Law, 3 ANN. HEALTH LAW 103, 103
(1994).
2 See Bryan A. Liang, Medical Malpractice: Do Physicians Have Knowledge of Legal
Standards and Assess Cases as Juries Do?, 3 U. Cm. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 59, 60 (1996).
3 This is consistent with Learned Hand's well known B < PL formula, where liability
depends on whether the burden (B) of taking precautions, i.e., the cost of an accident preven-
tion, is less than the cost of the expected injury (L) if the accident occurs, discounted by the
probability (P) of its occurrence. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947).
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care in an effort to reduce and/or prevent injury to patients. 4 Indeed, as
Prosser notes:
The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm has
been quite important in the field of torts .... When the
decisions of the courts become known, and [potential]
defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is
of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of
the harm. Not infrequently one reason for imposing lia-
bility is the deliberate purpose of providing that
incentive.5
Through imposition of liability, this deterrent effect is a prominent ra-
tionale and justification for the existing system.
In addition to providing this overall incentive structure for physician
care, the tort system has another theoretical benefit. The system, through
its "teaching" role as communicated in the case law, can function dynam-
ically by specifying its standards across time as to what constitutes so-
cially acceptable (nonnegligent) behavior. The case law can thus provide
physicians with ongoing rules of conduct that delineate what care is so-
cially acceptable (nonnegligent) and socially unacceptable (negligent) for
fact-specific clinical circumstances.
Note, however, that the tort system's deterrence structure is predi-
cated on two extremely important assumptions. The first is actor knowl-
edge: physicians are assumed to be knowledgeable about the malpractice
system and its deterrence structure. Presumably, actors must have
knowledge of a deterrence structure in order to be affected by it. Sec-
ondly, the incentive system mandates and assumes that the lay agents of
the adjudicatory structure assess physician action using the same stan-
dard that the actors themselves use to make the care decisions, i.e., medi-
cal appropriateness. Because physicians acquire this knowledge through
their medical training and lay agents of the legal system are educated
about this standard during the adjudicatory process, theoretically both
should make the same assessment as to the relative negligence of the
physician in question (the former ex ante, the latter ex post). Indeed,
assessments and standards of reasonable behavior must be constant
4 This deterrence effect has been described in the medical literature in the context of the
B < PL formula. See, e.g., William B. Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Damages, and
Deterrence: An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEW ENO. J. MED. 1282 (1978).
However, note that maintaining this deterrence effect may not be the sole driving force behind
adjudication of these cases; for example, it has been reported that an excessive number of
lawyers in a particular market can account for an increase in malpractice claim filings. See
Lawrence Southwick, Jr. & Gary J. Young, Lawyers and Medical Torts: Medical Malpractice
Litigation as a Residual Option, 24 APPLrED EcoN. 989 (1992).
5 W. PAGE KEETrON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON an LAW oF TORTS §4, at 25 (5th
ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
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across physicians and juries to accomplish the optimal desired effect on
the physician-actor's behavior.6
However, this set of fundamental assumptions, the foundation of the
malpractice tort system and premise of the deterrence structure, has not
been studied in the context of what actual physicians know or what they
can access. Some studies have assessed how specific, well-known cases
affect physician practice, while others have performed retrospective re-
views to determine the agreement between jury verdicts and the relative
negligence of a physician by using extensive insurance claims records or
the specific patients' medical charts.7 But famous cases, insurance com-
pany claims records, and detailed chart reviews, besides being subject to
significant hindsight bias,8 are not the kind of materials typical physi-
6 If the actors within the incentive structure and the lay agents who assess their behavior
are under different understandings regarding appropriate versus inappropriate care, it is un-
likely that the incentive structure goals of optimal deterrence and cost-effective provision of
care will be fulfilled in any meaningful way. See also infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443; Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions
on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. Rv. 345 (1981) (assessing
whether particular cases have had an effect on physician practice). However, these studies,
which assert that the common law standard of malpractice is known to physicians, are based
upon analysis of two extraordinary cases: Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a mental health provider had a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect third parties whose well-being was threatened by a patient); and Helling v.
Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that a court could change the medical standard of
practice and impose liability even though the customary standard of care was provided and
followed). Clearly these cases had such an impact and changed the law so dramatically that
providers would be expected to have some knowledge of them. However, these studies did not
assess the impact of general case law, available reports of malpractice decisions, nor determine
knowledge of the legal rule of malpractice (negligence). These studies also used closed-ended
multiple choice questions that identified the relevant cases as a potential source of change in
practice and thus, possibly signaled the physicians to this response. See also Michelle J.
White, The Value of Liability in Medical Malpractice, 13 IAmT AF. 75 (1994) (concluding
that the medical malpractice system sends providers a "clear" signal that they should avoid
providing substandard care); Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians' Perceptions of the Risk of
Being Sued, 17 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y L. 463, 479 (1992) (finding that physicians take actions
to reduce patient injuries in response to potential tort liability); Mark I. Taragin et al., The
Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 117 ANN. INr. MED. 780 (1992) (indicating a positive relationship between negligent
care and jury-awarded compensation); Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and
Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA 1599 (1989) (also indicating a positive relation between neg-
ligent care and jury-awarded compensation). These studies were based upon retrospective
reviews of insurance company claims records. See also FRANK A. SLOAN Er AL., SUING FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993) (finding that the malpractice system screens out non-meritori-
ous claims, and its results are consistent with independent physician assessments of cases).
This study relied on evaluation by a panel of expert physicians using medical records and
charts. Thus, these latter studies which use insurance company records and patient charts do
not measure the ex ante effect of the tort system's adjudications and once again do not assess
the impact of the case law, available malpractice decisions, or knowledge of negligence.
8 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability
in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HuM. BmAv. 89 (1995); see also Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine,
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cians can access when trying to discover "the decisions of the courts." 9
Indeed, Prosser contemplates that it is the reported judgments in these
liability cases (and presumably their facts) that will provide the incentive
structure to guide future physician behavior in fact-specific circum-
stances, not detailed records and information available only on an aca-
demic research basis.10
Furthermore, most studies have not assessed whether physicians
have objective knowledge of negligence-the standard by which they are
being judged. 11 This is an important component that should be evaluated
when determining whether knowledge of the legal rule is connected with
a physician's ability to spot negligence in medical care when he or she
sees it.
In addition to these theoretical incentive structure considerations,
two other important points require attention when studying the malprac-
tice system. First, physicians may know nothing (or, in fact, have incor-
rect knowledge) of the legal system and this may affect their behavior in
a manner which is inconsistent with the goals of the incentive structure.
Second, juries may use alternative standards and/or lack understanding of
the correct medical appropriateness rule used in assessing physician ac-
tions. These pragmatic concerns have generally been ignored in previous
work. 12
However, beyond these factors, by its mere existence the malprac-
tice system could still function as an effective (but perhaps not optimally
efficient) deterrence structure. If physicians had the ability to predict
jury verdicts correctly, and act on this knowledge ex ante, an effective
deterrence structure could still result. The degree to which the care pro-
vided is optimally efficient would, of course, depend on how juries spe-
Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996)
(finding that negligence adjudications by mock jurors are significantly increased when an ad-
verse result is present in Tarasoff cases); Norman G. Poythress et al., Reframing the Medical
Malpractice Tort Reform Debate: Social Science Research Inplications for Non-Economic
Reforms, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 65 (1992) (criticizing the medical malpractice tort system
as ineffective in deterring negligent care on the basis of psychological learning theory analysis
and hindsight bias). Indeed, this effect may be magnified rather than reduced by additional
information such as expert testimony. See Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased
Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 311 (1990);
see also Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Outcome Feedback: Hindsight and Infor-
mation, 15 J. Exp. PSYCHOL. 605 (1989) (when recalling past events, individuals selectively
remember "preferable" results). In addition, beyond differential assessments of care on the
basis of hindsight, there may indeed be different standards of care that go unrecognized by the
adjudicatory process. See Liang, supra note 2, at 65-66.
9 See KETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 25.
10 See id. at 25-26.
11 See, e.g., supra note 7 for empirical studies that do not assess physician knowledge of
negligence; see also Liang, supra note 2 for a study which has assessed this knowledge.
12 But see Liang, supra note 2.
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cifically adjudicate cases and allocate the relative costs. This alternate
model of deterrence has yet to be studied and its applicability to the med-
ical malpractice system is not known.
Hence, it appears that there has been very little research conducted
on assessing the crucial deterrence assumptions of the malpractice sys-
tem under the Prosser or alternate model in the context of what could be
expected in typical practice. This work represents an effort to assess
those assumptions through a case study of a high risk medical specialty:
anesthesiology. This specialty is particularly interesting because it has
traditionally been a source for costly malpractice claims;13 thus, physi-
cians in this specialty would be expected to be particularly sensitive to
issues of medical malpractice.
II. METHODS
The focus of this case study is a qualitative examination of three
important aspects related to the malpractice system: physician knowledge
of the system, physician-jury agreement on accessible jury verdict mal-
practice decisions, and physician ability to correctly predict jury verdicts.
The first aspect, physician knowledge, was examined using the study
question: Do physicians have knowledge of the tort system through an
understanding of the definition of negligence 14 (the standard by which
they are being judged) and the case law (the formal communication
method between the legal system and society including physicians)? The
second aspect, physician-jury agreement on jury verdict cases, was tested
with the study question: Do physicians assess defendant physician be-
havior in accessible malpractice case decisions the same way juries do?
Related to this, can nonphysicians, without medical or legal knowledge,
perform as well in assessing these cases as physicians? Finally, the last
aspect, physician ability to predict jury verdicts, was evaluated using the
question: What is the accuracy of verdict prediction by physicians for
cases where they deem they have enough information to assess the
clinical circumstance and cases where they believe they do not?
The sample of physicians for this case study was drawn from the
anesthesiology department of a primary teaching hospital of Harvard
Medical School. It was thought that anesthesiologists at an academic
medical center of a medical school would be the most informed regard-
13 Administration of general anesthesia represents one of the costliest areas of malprac-
tice claims in total volume. See Bill Clements, Don't Get Sued, AM. MED. NEWS, July 11,
1994, at 18.
14 The traditional definition of negligence is based upon four factors: a pre-existing duty,
breach of that duty, that causes, damages. See RicIARD A. EPsTEiN, CASES AND MATRIaALS
ON TORTS 128 (5th ed. 1990). In the malpractice context, there is a pre-existing duty to pro-
vide medically appropriate care that a practitioner in good standing would provide; a breach of
that duty may cause patient injury.
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ing medically appropriate practice and/or would be the physicians setting
the medical appropriateness standard (e.g., through expert testimony,
publications in the field, etc.). All physicians in this study were anesthe-
siologists (AAs; 15 n = 11) and all jury verdict cases were anesthesia
cases.
A survey method was utilized to ascertain the answers to the study
questions. The survey was composed of two parts. Part I consisted of
collecting information on physician demographics (i.e., years of experi-
ence, academic title, board certification, residency training site), the pres-
ence of any formal medical malpractice programs at the hospital, the
legal definition of negligence as understood by the physicians, 16 as well
as physician sources for medical malpractice information. Part I utilized
an open-ended question format so as not to signal to the physicians a
particular response that a set of supplied answers might induce.
Part II of the survey is comprised of twelve actual jury verdict cases
for physician assessment. Cases were selected through a search in the
LEXIS, Verdct Library, ALLVER file; WESTLAW, LRP-JV database;
and a review of the National Jury Verdict Review and Analysis Newslet-
ter. These case decisions have been deemed accessible to physicians be-
cause they are publicly available if physicians want to review (and thus
learn from) them, in contrast to the unavailable insurance company
claims records and medical charts relied on by previous studies. After
initial collection, the cases were then narrowed to the study cases 17 in
consultation with a physician anesthesiologist. 18 The cases chosen were
those deemed to have enough relevant clinical information for physician
assessment. Note that none of the cases selected had any requirement for
a pre-existing duty (each case had an established physician-patient rela-
tionship) nor damages (each case involved some patient injury). Thus,
the only assessments to be made were breach of duty and causation, the
two negligence factors that generally require expert testimony on medi-
cal appropriateness.' 9 The physicians were asked to assess whether the
care provided by the defendant physician was "Negligent," "Most Likely
15 "AA" is defined as Academic Anesthesiologist.
16 Note that physicians were not asked to provide a list of the factors that constitute
negligence. Instead, the contents of their responses were assessed to determine if they in-
cluded any of the factors. Thus, for example, a response of "not giving the right care" was
considered a breach of duty.
17 Refer to Appendix 2 for the text of the study cases.
18 The anethesiologist was an attending physician at Harvard Medical School at the time
of the study.
19 See Amsler v. Verrilli, 501 N.Y.S.2d 411 (App. Div. 1986) (malpractice verdict find-
ing liability can be sustained only if departure from the standard of care is the proximate cause
as established by expert testimony). Thus, because physicians were required to assess the
cases using only their knowledge of medical appropriateness, their assessments as to negli-
gence should match the actual jury verdicts.
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Negligent," "Can't Tell," "Most Likely Not Negligent," or "Not Negli-
gent." A "Can't Tell" response option was provided so that physicians
who did not feel comfortable assessing a particular case did not have to.
These responses were assigned a Likert value (5, 4, 3, 2, 1,
respectively). 20
Physicians were interviewed once in person by the author for Part I
and H1 of the study; physicians were explicitly told (at this stage) not to
predict what they thought the juries might have concluded, but to evalu-
ate the cases on the basis of their own professional training as to medi-
cally appropriate care. At least three months later, physicians were
mailed the cases from Part 11 and again asked to evaluate them; at this
point, physicians were also asked to predict what they believed to be the
actual jury verdicts. Note that on the second administration, the order of
the cases was reversed in an attempt to ameliorate case order bias. A set
of non-physicians / non-lawyers (hereinafter "NPNLs") (n = 12) were
also asked to evaluate the cases and predict jury verdicts in the same
fashion as physicians in the second administration of Part 11.21 The sur-
vey is reproduced in the Appendix.
Statistical significance was based on Student t-test analysis (two-
tailed) and calculations were made utilizing Microsoft Excel 3.0 for the
Macintosh; p values less than 0.05 were considered significant.
m. RESULTS
A. PHYSICIANS
1. Part I Survey Results
The demographic information and answers to the open-ended ques-
tions from Part I of the survey are summarized in Table 1. As expected
of physicians at an academic medical center, most were board certified
anesthesiologists at the time of the study, with the exception of one, who
was taking the anesthesia specialty boards two months after the survey
was completed. Further, as expected at an academic center, all physi-
cians had some academic title. It is interesting to note that this academic
medical center did not have a formal program concerning medical mal-
practice even though anesthesiology is a high risk specialty; however,
this is consistent with findings from previous work on medical
malpractice. 22
20 Likert Values are numerical values assigned to categorical variable responses for data
evaluation purposes.
21 These respondents were individuals who responded to a request for nonphysician,
nonlawyer volunteers to fill out a medical malpractice survey posted at a university and an
elementary school teachers' lounge.
22 See Liang, supra note 2, at 64.
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The results of Part I of the survey suggest that physicians appeared
to have little if any knowledge of the medical malpractice system from
the perspective of the legal standard of negligence or its communicatory
method-the case law. Physicians identified, on average, only 1.55 of
four factors of negligence (standard deviation 0.66) (see Table 1).
Although one physician (AA10) had a law degree as well as an advanced
law degree, even she did not identify all four factors of negligence.
There appeared to be no relationship between number of negligence fac-
tors identified and years of experience (p = 0.21).
In addition to these physicians' incomplete understanding of the
legal definition of negligence, they also had affirmatively incorrect per-
ceptions of the legal standard. For example, physicians reported that a
finding of negligence required a willful act, an act below the standards in
the locality,2 3 an act of omission, an act of commission, and a contractual
relationship. Finally, these physicians reported no knowledge of the
case law in response to the Part I question regarding their source of med-
ical malpractice knowledge.
2. Part II Survey Results
Of the 132 total physician encounters 24 in the first administration of
Part I, 19% of the encounters were not evaluated as "Negligent," "Most
Likely Negligent," "Most Likely Not Negligent," or "Not Negligent"
(i.e., "Can't Tell" response, n = 25), while a total of 81% of the en-
counters were evaluated as one category of negligent or not negligent (n
= 107). In the second administration of Part II, of the 120 total physician
encounters, 17% of the encounters were not evaluated (i.e., "Can't Tell"
response, n = 20), while 83% were evaluated (n = 100) (one physician
did not return the second survey which accounts for fewer total en-
counters on the second administration).
There was a wide range of physician assessment agreement with
jury verdicts by case (range 0.00-1.00) (see Table 2, which includes re-
sults from both first and second administrations of Part II of the survey).
Physician assessment agreement with jury verdicts was defined as fol-
lows: if a jury verdict was rendered for the plaintiff patient, a response
of "Negligent" or "Most Likely Negligent" was considered "agreement"
and assigned a value of one; if a response for the case was "Most Likely
Not Negligent" or "Not Negligent," then the response was considered
"not in agreement" and assigned a value of zero. Thus, the closer the
agreement value is to one, the greater the physician agreement is with the
23 National standards are in fact the generally applicable standard, particularly for board
certified specialties such as anesthesiology. See EpsTEIN, supra note 14, at 182-83.
24 An encounter is defined as a physician or NPNL case evaluation cell, i.e., a physician
or NPNL opportunity to evaluate a particular case scenario.
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actual jury verdict. A similar method was used for jury verdicts for de-
fendant physicians.
Combining all cases, physician assessment agreement with jury ver-
dicts was 58% for the first survey administration and 56% for the second
(see Table 3, which summarizes data on physician agreement, Likert val-
ues, and prediction values for Part II of the survey). Further, these agree-
ment values across survey administrations were not significantly
different (matched pairs, p = 0.16).25 Consistent-with their agreement
values, physician mean Likert values also did not differ between the ad-
ministration of the surveys by case (p range: 0. 11-1.00)26 or by physician
(p range: 0.21-1.00).27
However, at only 0.58 and 0.56 concordance, both these physician
agreement values were significantly different from actual jury verdicts
(by physician p = 0.018 for the first and p = 0.021 for the second admin-
istration). And, as might be expected by their overall low level of agree-
ment with the actual jury verdicts, there was significant physician
disagreement with the actual jury verdicts for five of the twelve case
scenarios; four of these five were disagreements going against the physi-
cian defendant (i.e., actual verdict was for physician defendant and study
physicians erred and deemed the physician defendant negligent).28
When physicians were asked to predict what the juries found in
each case, they predicted verdicts- correctly 57% of the time; this low
success rate was significantly different from the actual jury verdicts (over
all cases, p < 0.001; by physician, p = 0.017) (see Table 3). Interestingly,
in the circumstances where physicians evaluated a case (i.e., gave a re-
sponse other than "Can't Tell"), physicians predicted jury verdicts com-
pletely in concert with their own assessments of the case (i.e., if a
physician felt that the defendant physician in the case was negligent, the
physician prediction of the actual jury verdict would be guilty). Thus,
these physicians may not believe that the malpractice system assesses
physician negligence inappropriately; otherwise, they would predict jury
25 Recall that the order of the cases on the second administration was reversed. Thus,
physician case evaluations are most likely independent of any significant order bias.
26 The corresponding cases and p values are: case 1, p = 0.20; case 2, p = 0.16; case 3, p
= 1.0; case 4, p = 0.86; case 5, p = 0.76; case 6, p = 0.11; case 7, p = 0.16; case 8, p = 0.61;
case 9, p = 0.27; case 10, p = 0.52; case 11, p = 0.67; and case 12, p = 0.93.
27 The corresponding physicians and p values are: AAI: 0.52; AA2: 0.48; AA3 did not
return the second survey; AA4: 0.88; AA5: 0.71; AA6: 0.70; AA7: 1.00; AA8: 0.21; AA9:
0.73; AA10: 0.38; and AAll: 0.42.
28 Cases which were statistically different were case 2 (for both first and second adminis-
trations, p < 0.001); case 8 (for both first and second administrations, p < 0.001); case 9 (for
both first and second administrations, p < 0.001); case 11 (for both first and second administra-
tions, p = 0.002); and case 12 (for the first administration, p < 0.001; for the second adminis-
tration, p = 0.003).
19971
130 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:121
verdicts to be relatively more negligent than their clinical assessments of
the cases.
For those cases in which the physicians gave a "Can't Tell" re-
sponse, i.e., "gray area" cases, physicians correctly predicted actual jury
verdicts only 55% of the time (see Table 6). Again, this low prediction
success rate was a statistically significant difference from actual jury ver-
dicts (p < 0.001).
3. Negligence Knowledge and Assessment Agreement
Two findings in Part I were related to Part II. Physicians in Part I
had varying degrees of incomplete knowledge as to the definition of neg-
ligence as well as affirmatively incorrect perceptions of the legal stan-
dard. However, the number of negligence factors identified in Part I did
not appear to be correlated with the relative physician assessment agree-
ment with jury verdicts (first survey, r = -0.160, p = 0.64, second survey,
r = -0.145, p = 0.67) or years of experience (first survey, r = -0.084, p =
0.81; second survey, r = 0.145, p = 0.67). Similarly, the presence of
physician misperceptions of the legal standard of negligence was not cor-
related to their relative assessment agreement with juries in Part HI of the
survey (first administration, p = 0.79; second administration, p = 0.80).
B. NPNLs
NPNLs evaluated 84% of the encounters (n = 121) and answered
"Can't Tell" on 16% (n = 23). Similar to physicians, there was a wide
range of agreement with jury verdicts by case (range 0.00-1.00) (see Ta-
ble 4). NPNLs agreed with jury verdicts 59% of the time.29 This result
was significantly different from that of juries (by NPNL, p = 0.014) (see
Table 5). However, this figure was not significantly different from that
of physicians (by respondents, first survey, p = 0.78, second survey, p =
0.72).
NPNLs' predictions of jury verdicts for each case, combining all
cases, were correct 64% of the time. As with physicians, this level was
significantly different from that of juries (by NPNL, p = 0.025) (see Ta-
ble 5). Although this 64% figure was higher than physician prediction
success (at 57%), the difference was not statistically significant (p =
0.25). NPNLs acted similarly to physicians and predicted jury verdicts
completely in concert with their own assessments of negligence.
However, for gray area cases, NPNLs made correct predictions of
the actual jury verdicts a remarkable 96% of the time. This value was
not significantly different from the actual jury verdicts (p = 0.37), but it
was significantly different from physician predictive success (at 55%) in
29 Agreement was calculated as in supra Part M.A.2.
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these cases (p = 0.003) (see Table 6). Likert values were significantly
different between physicians and NPNLs in case 1, second survey (1.6
versus 2.58, respectively); case 2, second survey (4.5 versus 3.5, respec-
tively); case 6, second survey (3.7 versus 4.5, respectively); and case 8,
first and second surveys (3.82/3.60 versus 2.58, respectively).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Do PHYSICIANS KNOW ABOUT THE TORT SYSTEM THROUGH
KNOWLEDGE OF NEGLIGENCE AND THE CASE LAW?
The Prosser model of deterrence theorizes that an actor that is to be
affected by an incentive structure must theoretically know of that struc-
ture so as to be impacted by it.3 ° The results of this case study raise the
issue that physicians may lack this critical knowledge. Thus, if these
results are applicable beyond the anesthesiology context, the tort deter-
rence structure may not be having its theoretically assumed effect on
physician behavior.31
Physicians in this study were found to have incomplete knowledge
of negligence. In other words, the actors within the incentive system
were generally uninformed regarding the rule by which their activities
were being assessed. In addition to their incomplete knowledge, the phy-
sicians in this study also exhibited affirmatively incorrect conceptions of
the legal rule. Alas, this ignorance and misperception appears to be more
widespread than just the physicians in this study. Previous work has also
reported that physicians have an incorrect understanding of the legal
rule.32 For example, radiologists indicated that legally negligent care re-
quired a willful, deliberate act; an unintentional act; an act of commis-
sion rather than omission; and treatment resulting in a long term,
permanent injury.3 3 Radiologists also reported that a poor medical out-
come alone was adequate for a finding of negligence.34 Physician misin-
formation is significant because it illustrates not only an incomplete
understanding of the incentive structure, potentially resulting in less than
optimal behavior, but also an incorrect one, potentially inducing im-
proper behavior. Thus, the actual effect of the incentive structure as cur-
rently understood by physicians may depart substantially from the
theoretical ideal.
30 See KEETON Er AL., supra note 5, at 25.
31 Shuman has questioned the effectiveness of the deterrence structure in the tort system
because it is not consistent with any psychiatric or psychological theory of human behavior.
Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. RFv. 115, 128
(1993). However, his work did not report any empirical data nor focus upon medical malprac-
tice; see also Poythress et al., supra note 8; Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 8.
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In addition, not only were legal rules incompletely and incorrectly
assessed and understood, but physicians also had no knowledge of the
case law-the formal method whereby the dictates of the legal system
are pronounced to the general public, including physicians. 35 Thus, if
these results are generalizable, the key communicatory method between
the law and the actors to be affected by the system (i.e., physicians) was
unknown to the actors themselves. Hence the dynamic role of the case
law to "teach" the actors within the system the appropriate (socially ac-
ceptable, i.e., nonnegligent) actions and deter the inappropriate (socially
unacceptable, i.e., negligent) actions may not be as effectively accom-
plished as is theoretically supposed.
From one perspective, these results are somewhat unexpected since
the state in which all of these physicians are practicing and have their
medical licenses requires ten hours of "risk management" continuing
medical education credit annually. 36 This "risk management" informa-
tion is generally focused on medical malpractice. However, realistically,
these results are not surprising at all. Although the legal system's incen-
tive structure assumes actor knowledge of its pronouncements, fact-spe-
cific cases on the trial level such as jury verdict cases are not, as a rule,
published for general dissemination. Cases are published solely if they
have some independent, legal significance and usually have little rele-
vance to clinical practice.37 Thus, without a ready source of information,
it would appear difficult for physicians to "learn" from the legal system's
formal and available case law "teaching."
Only if physicians were to take the initiative and subscribe to unof-
ficial newsletters or electronic databases would this information become
readily available. Thus, ignorance of the incentive structure's official
communication method would be a likely finding since this method pro-
vides virtually no relevant information to physicians as to appropriate
clinical behavior.
From the physicians' perspective, it would not be surprising that
most physicians lack knowledge regarding the law as a guiding source on
medical behavior. Because of the extensive degree of medical informa-
35 This finding is also consistent with previous work. See id.
36 All states require that physicians complete a certain number of continuing medical
education (CME) credit hours annually in an attempt to assure competence in the field and to
inform physicians of the most recent developments in their specified area of practice. For
example, Massachusetts and Hawaii both require fifty CME credits per year in order for a
physician to maintain his or her medical license in those states.
37 See, e.g., Harding v. Noble Taxi Corp., 582 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (error
for trial court to advise jury at length for its reasons for dismissing claims against two defend-
ants in a multi-party malpractice suit); Foflygen v. Zemel, 615 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (unfair trade practices and consumer protection laws do not apply to medical providers
in informed consent cases). These examples give physicians little guidance as to medically
appropriate care for specific clinical scenarios.
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tion that must be assimilated to maintain professional competence, it
would be unlikely for a physician to access non-medical sources for in-
sight as to medically appropriate, nonnegligent care.38
In addition to general ignorance of the legal incentive structure, the
finding that physician years of experience did not relate to the number of
negligence factors identified was particularly troubling. This implies that
even with increasing experience in the profession and continuing medical
education, there is no corresponding increase in aggregate knowledge
stemming from a transfer of information from the legal to the medical
system, i.e., from the source of the incentive structure to the community
of actors to be affected.
Hence, there appears to be little in the way of legal "teaching" in
terms of the legal rule or clinically appropriate action for fact-specific
medical circumstances over time for these physicians. Indeed, communi-
cation between the legal and medical professions seems limited if not
nonexistent.
Overall, physicians in this case study exhibited incomplete and, in
some cases, incorrect knowledge of the tort system's standard of behav-
ior assessment which is not improved by experience. This fact, coupled
with the finding that physicians have no knowledge of the mode by
which the legal system communicates to the actors that are to be affected,
38 Of course it could be argued that physicians have an incentive to learn about the
medical malpractice system due to its significant effect upon potential pecuniary loss. How-
ever, structurally, the tort system may not act as an effective deterrence structure for physi-
cians. See Shuman, supra note 31, at 128. In addition, physicians may simply be limited as to
their resources in terms of time or attention span due to their medical system efforts to main-
tain professional competence. See generally HERERT A. SIMON, THBoRIEs OF BOUNDED RA-
TONALITY IN DEasioNs AND ORGANIZATION 161 (C.B. McGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1972).
Professional cultural differences may also preclude nonmedical sources from being effective
communicatory modes. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, it could be *argued that physicians do not have any incentive to learn
about the medical malpractice system due to the availability of malpractice insurance. Be-
cause there may be no pecuniary loss or exposure, physicians may be indifferent to malpractice
judgments. However, malpractice insurance may not cover all pecuniary losses; physicians
may also have nonpecuniary costs associated with malpractice adjudications; and there are
significant costs associated with a malpractice judgment or settlement if payment is made on
behalf of the physicians, e.g., a mandated report to the National Practitioner Data Bank. See
45 C.F.R. §60 (1994); Liang, supra note 2, at 69 n.32. Finally, another possible argument that
would appear to militate against learning about the malpractice system is the advent of man-
aged care; since the managed care organization may shoulder liability for the physician's ac-
tion, he or she can be indifferent to a malpractice judgment. However, physicians are usually
considered to be independent contractors and thus, ostensible agency or respondeat superior
liability of the managed care organization would generally not apply; hence, physicians would
assume all liability for patient injury. See id.; see also Bryan A. Liang, Deselection Under
Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow for Maintaining Patient-Physician Relationships in the Era
of Managed Care?; 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 799 (1997) (arguing that physicians in the cur-
rent health care climate are not traditional independent contractors or employees and thus
another legal standard may need to be crafted to encompass their unique status).
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presents an incentive structure that could significantly depart from the
theoretical one assumed by legal and economic researchers.
An important implication of incomplete, incorrect, and static physi-
cian information regarding the legal system is the practice of defensive
medicine.39 For example, physician misperceptions of the legal standard
such as a belief that malpractice "requires" an act of omission may in-
duce the physician to perform an excess of tests and procedures in an
effort to avoid any such adjudication, a classic form of defensive
medicine. Of course, this circumstance is not optimal since this addi-
tional treatment of the patient imposes risks of injury upon the patient
that would not be incurred but for the incorrect understanding of the legal
rule.40
Hence, one of the malpractice system's important theoretical func-
tions, to provide an incentive structure to reduce patient injury to mini-
mal (socially acceptable) levels, may actually induce the actors within it
to behave nonoptimally. For example, physicians may expose patients to
increasing levels of injury. Thus, the structure's departure from the as-
sumed precept of actor knowledge of its judgment and communication
tenets has patient care implications and hence is an important considera-
tion to address in the future study of malpractice.
B. Do PHYSICIANS ASSESS MALPRACTICE CASES THE SAME WAY
JURIES Do?
The tort incentive structure assumes that a physician will determine
the appropriate action in a specific clinical circumstance based on the
standard of medical appropriateness. Physicians define this standard
themselves. 41 Theoretically, the lay agents of the legal system, juries,
use this same standard to assess whether the physician in question has
acted negligently or nonnegligently. Thus, if two groups are given the
same medical facts and circumstances and utilize the same standard of
39 Defensive medicine can lead to either an excessive provision or an underprovision of
care, rendered in response to legal considerations rather than in response to actual medical
indications. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE, OTA-H-602 2 (July 1994); Roger A. Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical
Malpractice: Professional Liability, 257 JAMA 2776 (1987); Steven Zuckerman, Medical
Malpractice: Claims, Legal Costs, and the Practice of Defensive Medicine, 3 HEALTH AFF.
128 (1984); Steven Shavell, Theoretical Issues in Medical Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 35 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978). It has been estimated that defensive
medicine practice will add $40 billion to U.S. medical costs by the year 2000. Daniel N.
Mendelson, Why Malpractice Refonn is Risky Business, Bus. & HEALTH, June 1995, at 38.
40 Note that misperceptions can lead to an inappropriate avoidance of care resulting in
patient harm. See infra notes 70, 71, and accompanying text.
41 Physicians, like other professionals, define their own appropriate level of care. The
level of care required, theoretically, to avoid an adjudication of negligence is that level of care
"ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing." See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, §32 at 187; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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assessment, theoretically, these two groups should assess cases similarly
at least most of the time. However, this study found that physicians'
assessments of the defendant physicians differed markedly from those of
the actual juries.
If the significant divergence between physician assessments of the
cases and actual jury verdicts found in this case study is generally preva-
lent, then there may be some question as to the use or understanding of
the standard of medical appropriateness by these two groups. Thus, de-
termining the source of this divergence is critical in order to understand
how and why the incentive system departs from its theoretical ideal, and
what the implications are for the system as it is currently structured.
On the one hand, potential sources of divergence could be from the
physician side.42 On a basic level, physicians in this study could simply
be categorically uninformed regarding the medically appropriate care in
anesthesia. Yet this is unlikely since these physicians were all highly
trained and practicing at a major academic medical center. In fact, it
would be expected that these physicians would be more informed regard-
ing clinical appropriateness in the specialty rather than less. Another
possibility is that, rather than being categorically ignorant, the physicians
in this study could be categorically biased to a single medical viewpoint
due to their academic homogeneity. But militating against this possibil-
ity is the fact that approximately half of the time study physicians agreed
with the actual jury verdicts.
Another source of divergence could be that the study physicians
were simply favoring the defendant physicians over plaintiffs when as-
sessing the cases. However, an interesting and relevant sociological phe-
nomena that was encountered during the physician interviews is worthy
of note. Specifically, although it might very well be expected that physi-
cians would hesitate to find other physicians negligent, during interviews
with the anesthesiologists in this case study there was a significant pro-
pensity for the study physicians to be extremely critical of the defendant
anesthesiologists in the cases. Perhaps because these were academic
physicians, they had a lower threshold for noting and commenting upon
the perceived deficiency in the care by others; indeed in another empiri-
cal study, academic physicians (radiologists) also heavily criticized the
defendant physicians in the cases.43
42 Note that the lack of knowledge of the legal standard of negligence should not play
any role in this divergence since physicians were told to base their assessments of the cases on
their own clinical training, which should theoretically provide the same results as jury assess-
ments. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
43 Unpublished information from the study is reported in Liang, supra note 2, at 73-74
nn.39-40.
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Beyond these considerations, physicians in this study did not uni-
formly disagree with juries in favor of the anesthesiologist defendants.
Recall that of the five cases that these physicians deemed significantly
different from actual verdicts, four of them were in fact defendant ver-
dicts, so physicians were erring on the side of plaintiffs and deeming the
defendant physicians more negligent rather than less.
In addition, in the four cases where there were significant Likert
value differences between physicians and NPNLs, study physicians pro-
vided values that were relatively more negligent (i.e., higher Likert val-
ues) half the time. If the study physicians were systematically biased for
the defendant physicians, it would be expected that study physicians
would rate all defendant physician actions relatively less negligent (i.e.,
lower Likert values) all of the time, which they did not.44
On the other hand, the source of divergence may not rest with phy-
sicians but with the juries themselves. It could be that juries may misun-
derstand the legal standard by which they are to assess medical
behavior 45 or that they assess medical behavior on the basis of something
44 Note that in a previous study, nonphysicians appeared to be the parties who were
biased; they categorically gave statistically higher (i.e., relatively more negligent) Likert value
assessments as compared with physicians. See Liang, supra note 2, at 66.
45 Shavell has indicated that "the standard of care... may not be correctly chosen or
consistently applied .... Therefore, the opportunities for error and for inconsistent application
of standards by the agents [juries] of the incentive system [the malpractice system] are proba-
bly substantial." Shavell, supra note 39, at 47-48. Further, it has been reported that "[s]tudy
after study has shown that jurors do not understand the law they are given, often performing at
no better than chance level on objective tests of [legal] comprehension." Alan Reifman et al.,
Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 539, 540
(1992) (citing Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understanda-
ble: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. Rav. 1306 (1979); Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One? 52 LAW & CoNrEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989,
at 205; Amiran Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977); AimuM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Robert F. Forston, Sense and No-sense: Jury Trial Communication,
1975 BYU L. REv. 601; REiD HAsTm Er AL., INsIDE THE JuRY (1983); Martin F. Kaplan &
Gwen DeArment Kemnerick, Juror Judgment as Information Integration: Combining Eviden-
tial and Nonevidential Information, 30 J. Paas. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 493 (1974); Saul M. Kassin
& Lawrence S. Wrightman, On the Requirements of Proof. The Timing of Judicial Instruction
and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERs. & Soc. PsYcHOL. 1877 (1979); Nobert L. Kerr et al.,
Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule
on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. P RS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 282 (1976); Lawrence J.
Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. Rav. 153 (1982); and V. L. Smith, The Psycholog-
ical and Legal Implications of Pre-trial Instructions in the Law, (1987) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford University)). This misunderstanding extends both to procedural law as
well as to substantive law. Further, although understanding improves for procedural knowl-
edge when assisted by judicial instruction, on an absolute level it remains quite poor (less than
50% correct); and for knowledge of the substantive law, it stays poor even after such instruc-
tions. See Reifman et al., supra at 546-47; see also Dorothy K. Kegehiro, Defining the Stan-
dards of Proof in Jury Instructions, 1 PsYcHoL. ScL. 194 (1990) (reviewing juror
comprehension studies which report that levels of 50% or less have been found for mock
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other than or in addition to the legal standard.46 Supporting this conten-
tion is the finding that NPNLs, without medical or legal training, were
able to assess the cases as well as physicians.47 It would be expected that
individuals without medical or legal training would assess the cases in a
worse fashion (i.e., with less concordance) than those who have knowl-
edge of medical appropriateness through medical training. Thus, this rel-
atively high level of agreement may reflect the expression of some factor
other than legal or medical knowledge that is shared by these individuals
and juries. However, against this proposition is the fact that at least
some physicians agreed with the actual jury verdicts and thus juries may
have based their findings of negligence or nonnegligence on some appro-
priate standard of care. Of course, if juries use other factors in their
negligence assessments that result in similar assessments of that care by
physicians, the results may be simply coincidental to the appropriate use
of the standard of care itself. On the basis of the results in this case
study, it appears that, at best, medical knowledge is not helpful in deter-
mining what care is deemed negligent by juries. At worst, on the basis of
previous work, this knowledge may be a disadvantage in these
assessments. 48
Also supporting the possibility of a predominantly juror-based ex-
planation for physician-jury assessment divergence is an evaluation of
jurors and representative samples of jurors from Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Ne-
vada, and Washington). In the' criminal context, it has been reported that after seeing and
hearing video instructions, "only 50% of the instructed jurors understood that the defendant
did not have to present any evidence of his innocence, and that the state had to establish guilt,
with evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury
Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JuDicxAuRE 478, 481 (1976). However, even with these
studies, "[m]ost of the[ ] recommendations [to address these legal system weaknesses,
although] well received by law commissions, [have been] largely disregarded by legislatures,
and rejected by courts." William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric ofInnocence, 70 WASH. L. Rv. 329,
367 (1995). Indeed, even if several jurors are noted to be sleeping during the trial, a new trial
is not warranted because it is a common occurrence. See Stahnke v. Lontok, No. 95-2078, slip
op. at 5-6 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 1996).
46 See, e.g., Mark I. Taragin et al., Does Physician Performance Explain Interspeciality
Differences in Malpractice Claim Rates?, 32 MED. CARE 661 (1994) (finding that variation in
malpractice rates results from factors other than substantive differences in physician perform-
ance); Mark I. Taragin et al., Physician Demographics and the Risk of Medical Malpractice,
93 Am. J. MED. 537 (1992) (speculating that the higher malpractice claims rate for male physi-
cians is attributable to more effective interactions with patients by women); SLOAN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 59-60, 64-65 (finding that poor physician communication with patients is
correlated with malpractice claims and incidence); Marvin Comblath & Russell L. Clark, Neo-
natal "Brain Damage": An Analysis of 250 Claims, 140 W. J. MED. 298 (1984) (finding poor
legal concordance with medical assessment of infant brain damage cases).
47 NPNLs' prediction rate for all cases was higher than that of physicians (64% versus
57%, respectively), although this did not rise to the level of statistical significance. However,
in a previous study of malpractice, nonphysicians were statistically in agreement more often
with actual jury verdicts than physicians (p < 0.009). See Liang, supra note 2, at 66 n.22.
48 See id.
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the "gray area" cases. These circumstances are arguably the most rele-
vant for physicians and actual juries. For physicians, these gray-area
cases illustrate typical clinical scenarios encountered regularly in medical
practice. Ex ante, since medical practice is so broadly variable 49 and not
subject to a simple and single correct approach,50 physicians must often
make care decisions based on incomplete information and/or in circum-
stances where no specific clinical approach is readily apparent. Indeed,
these are also the circumstances most relevant to physicians in their in-
terface with the legal system since it is the unclear cases that may result
in a questionable action, potential patient injury, and thus a malpractice
Suit.51
For juries, these circumstances are the most relevant because the
often complex and technical aspects of human physiology, diagnosis,
treatment, disease, and variations in medical practice may require lay
juries with no medical and/or scientific background to make adjudicatory
assessments based on an incomplete or actual misunderstanding of the
medical and scientific facts and circumstances of the case. But beyond
the difficulties associated with medical and scientific assessments, this
concern also applies to jurors' understanding of the law, i.e., the legal
rule of negligence and its appropriate application to the particular case at
hand.52
However, in these gray-area encounters, NPNLs were quite signifi-
cantly able to predict the actual jury verdicts, exhibiting an astounding
96% correct prediction rate-clearly better than physicians and statisti-
cally indistinguishable from juries. Thus, the NPNLs' extremely high
predictive ability may again be based upon some other characteristic(s)
that they share with juries, apart from a knowledge of medicine or law,
which results in similar assessments of a physician's action. For exam-
ple, they may be using the presence or severity of injury as a proxy for
negligence, or they may simply be deeming causation as negligence.5 3
49 See infra note 63.
50 See infra note 62.
51 If the results of this study can be generalized, physicians will take the wrong action
(from the point of view of legal liability) almost 50% of the time, certainly not reflecting
behavior optimally affected by the tort system's deterrence structure. See also infra note 53.
52 See supra note 8 and supra note 45.
53 Severity of injury, not the presence of an adverse event or negligence, has been re-
ported to be predictive of a plaintiff verdict. See Troyen A. Brennan et a., Relation Between
Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996). See also White, supra note 7 (inferring that as severity of injury of
the plaintiff increases, there is an increased possibility of malpractice litigation and awards).
This was true for both care that was deemed "negligent" or "nonnegligent" by White and thus
raises the possibility that juries may be using presence or severity of injury as a proxy for
negligence. See Liang, supra note 2, at 76 n.43. Indeed, for anesthesiologists, it has been
reported that even when the physician provides "nonnegligent" care, liability is still imposed
42% of the time. See Cheney et al., supra note 7, at 1601. Note also that it has been reported
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This problem is complicated by hindsight bias. In fact, the presence
of injury and an ex post adjudication of liability has been described as an
illustration of juror hindsight bias: "[s]ince a failure to diagnose a disor-
der will look much more culpable after discovering the true nature of an
illness, doctors may be subject to liability even for reasonable diagnostic
procedures that turn out badly."'5 4 Experimentally, researchers have
found that "outcome knowledge [of injury] deeply affect[s] [mock ju-
rors'] interpretation of a complex story.... [And a] good faith effort to
determine a reasonable level of precautions in foresight may receive
harsh judgment when viewed in hindsight."55 Unfortunately, these re-
searchers also report that this hindsight bias is not corrected by specific
jury instructions regarding it; indeed, these instructions may have a
counterproductive effect.5 6 Thus,
[w]hen making determinations of negligence, it is impor-
tant to consider only whether the therapist acted accord-
ing to professional standards, not [simply] whether
damages occurred. As Beck... noted, "In general, there
is no malpractice if it can be shown that the defendant
used due care-i.e., practiced according to a usual or av-
erage [sic] standard of care. Even if someone is badly
hurt or killed, the law says that the injured party cannot
recover from the doctor if the doctor met this standard."
• . . [H]owever, [it appears] that the determination of
negligence is influenced by the report of damages or
harm. 57
In addition to physicians or juries serving as independent sources of
the assessment divergence found in this study, other sources could exist.
For example, the case decisions used in this study could be flawed.
However, if this is the situation, then the very existence of a Prosser-type
that a judge or jury in a malpractice case may simply be more likely to deem a physician
negligent if his or her actions caused injury. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some
Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 987 n.50
(1984). Other studies have indicated the weakness of the jury adjudicatory method in assess-
ing malpractice. See, e.g., M. Roy Schwarz, Liability Crisis: The Physician's Viewpoint, in
MEDicAL MALP~cAric-ToRT REFoRM 16 (James Hamner & B.R. Jennings eds., 1987). In
fact, juries may award malpractice plaintiffs greater amounts as compared with plaintiffs with
similar injuries resulting from other causes. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Jus-
tice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAw & CoNEW.
PRoBs., Winter & Spring 1991, at 5, 24-28, 36. Thus, Metzloff has called for close observa-
tion of the jury system because of the highly significant and complex role it plays. See
Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Medical Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54
LAw & CoNramp. PRoBs., Winter & Spring 1991, at 43.
54 Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 91.
55 Id. at 99.
56 See id.
57 LaBine & LaBine, supra note 8, at 510.
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incentive structure is called into question. Since trial court decisions are
often not published, the case decision descriptions provided here repre-
sent the only available sources of trial court decisions available to physi-
cians. Thus, these descriptions are, in fact, the theoretical bases for
physician "learning" from the medical malpractice system and most rele-
vant in assessing the tort signal. If these case scenarios are deficient in
effectively portraying the cases for physician "learning," then the legal
incentive structure is not providing any appropriate mode or forum for
physicians to learn ex ante just what is considered socially acceptable
medical care. In that case, there is no official or unofficial tort signal that
can guide physician behavior in an appropriate manner.
But aside from the accuracy of the case descriptions as related to the
actual cases themselves, the results of physician evaluations of these case
scenarios raise another difficulty for the malpractice system. In this
study, the participating group of academically trained physicians would
be expected to have significant insight as to the standard of medically
appropriate care. Further, the physicians in this case study were either
trained at the academic medical center or have over twenty years of ex-
perience there;5 8 this group as a whole would thus be expected to assess
clinical cases similarly. Yet the roughly 50% physician assessment di-
vergence within this group implies that approximately half of this aca-
demically trained, academically practicing physician group has an
understanding of medically appropriate care that is different from the
other, regardless of the accuracy of the case descriptions, raising the pos-
sibility that more than one acceptable standard of care exists.
However, assuming that the case descriptions provide some reason-
able depiction of the actual cases, on the basis of the results in this study,
half of the physicians must have a different interpretation of medical ap-
propriateness than the actual juries. This finding again presents the pos-
sibility that another acceptable standard of medically appropriate care
exists to which juries were not exposed or did not recognize, calling into
question the effectiveness of the adjudicatory process itself. The nature
of proving medical malpractice claims may provide for such a possibility
through the required use of expert testimony. 59 This problem is further
exacerbated by the frequent medical circumstance under which there is
no clear standard of care.60 As a result, some physicians may be consid-
58 Program A in Table 1 is the case study site hospital's anesthesiology residency
program.
59 See Richard L. Wiener, A Psychological and Empirical Approach to the Medical Stan-
dard of Care, 69 NEB. L. REv. 112 (1990) (discussing potential for experts to give opinions
not representative of the standard practice in the field); see also Hock & Lowenstein, supra
note 8 (hindsight bias results in reporting "preferred" results).
60 See William Meadow et al., What is the Legal 'Standard of Medical Care' When
There Is No Standard Medical Care? A Survey of the Use of Home Apnea Monitoring by
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ered negligent even though their care is in fact consistent with some ar-
guably reliable physician conception of medical appropriateness. This
result would send conflicting signals to physicians who are attempting to
provide medically appropriate care.
Other factors may also have a role in the divergence between physi-
cian assessments and actual jury verdicts. For example, this case study's
results showed a clear lack of correlation between physician agreement
with actual jury verdicts and knowledge of negligence. This indepen-
dence between how well physicians assess the cases (in terms of assess-
ment agreement) and knowledge of the law raises the possibility that
legal knowledge does not relate to effective prediction of legal adjudica-
tory results. If generally applicable, this raises the concern of whether
the malpractice deterrence structure is providing appropriately consistent
results using the legal rule and whether it would be fruitful to in fact have
knowledge of it.61
Neonatology Fellowship Training Programs in the United States, 89 PEDIArRICS 1083 (1992)
(describing the weakness of expert testimony based on an expert's personal experience in
establishing a standard of care).
61 Note that it may not be in society's best interest to have physicians learn about the
legal system. Socially, the highest benefit could be for physicians to focus upon medical study
in their respective fields. See Liang, supra note 2, at 67 n.27. However, there may be some
argument that physicians should in fact assess the harm that may occur in practice so that they
will behave in a fashion ex ante that will reflect this expected cost; this is the traditional
rationale for accurate assessment of damages in civil liability cases. See Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & EcoN. 191 passim (1996).-
Theoretically, this ideal is imbued within the malpractice system under the Hand formula. See
the discussion of Learned Hand's formula cited in note 3, supra. In contrast, if this ex post
damage level would not have been known to the potential injurer ex ante, it has no social value
since the assessment of the specific level of harm could not have been made. See Kaplow &
Shavell, supra at 192. Although Kaplow and Shavell discuss this consideration under the
rubric of physical harm of the victim/plaintiff, extension can be made on the basis of not only
potential physical harm, which would be unknown to potential injurers, but also to ex ante
determinations of liability probability in the malpractice system. Indeed, the varying medical
practice standards that appear apparent, as well as possible jury decisionmaking on the basis of
factors departing from the medical appropriateness standard, make determinations of expected
liability by potential injurers a haphazard exercise at best. Thus, a source of potential resource
waste in the adjudicatory process may result from ex post assessement of the magnitude of
harm when the harm is not determinable ex ante; and, an analysis of the malpractice system
indicates that another source-inability of its actors to accurately predict the probability of
liability-may also contribute to this waste. Further, if physicians have no ex ante knowledge
of either the formal legal standards and rules or the other methods that juries utilize in their
assessment of liability, optimal ex ante behavior will most likely not be effected, and ex post
accurate assessment of damages would be likely to be socially wasteful. Finally, accurate
assessment of damages may be further limited. For example, use by a court of some informa-
tion that is not available to a party ex ante will distort that party's incentives if he or she knows
that there is some information that will affect liability. Thus, it would be socially beneficial
for the court to ignore information that the party lacked ex ante. See Omri Ben-Shahar, In-
formed Courts, Uninformed Individuals and the Economics of Judicial Hindsight, 4 J. INsnru-
noNAL & THnoRmcAL ECON. 613 (1995).
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Finally, although they diverged from actual jury verdicts, an inter-
esting finding is that the physicians in this study were surprisingly con-
sistent in their case assessments over time. Substantively for
malpractice, the standard of care as understood by physicians could be
thought to change from circumstance to circumstance, i.e., physicians
vary across time in their approach to the same clinical circumstance, in-
dependent of changes in medical knowledge, due to the nature of medical
practice. 62 This could be a source of physician disagreement with jury
verdicts. Indeed, it has been reported that medical practice patterns vary
significantly across physicians. 63 Thus, it would appear possible that a
physician could have differing viewpoints regarding the appropriate care
for the patient and the same clinical scenario presented at different
times. 64 However, the physicians in this study exhibited highly similar
responses over time, both in terms of relative agreement as well as in
Likert values. Hence, although there may be significant interphysician
variation as to medical practice, intraphysician variation at least for these
physicians seems minimal, and physicians would seem to be quite con-
sistent in their assessments of specific clinical scenarios. 65 This consis-
62 The nature of medical practice dictates that the method of approaching a particular
clinical scenario is not necessarily constant, i.e., there is not one "right" way of evaluating,
diagnosing, and treating a patient in most clinical circumstances. Medical actions are primar-
ily a function of uncertainty as to the "best" management options, patient preferences, physi-
cian preferences, and other factors. See Eric M. Wall, Practice Guidelines: Promises or
Panacea?, 37 J. FAM. PRAc. 17 (1993).
63 See JOHN M. EISENBERG, DOCTORS' DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE: THE
REASONS FOR DOCTORS' PRACTCE PATTERNS AND THE WAYS TO CHANGE THEM (1986) (out-
lining variations in cardiac angiogramn interpretation); A.O. Berg, Variations Among Family
Physicians' Management Strategies for Lower Urinary Tract Infection in Women: A Report
from the Washington Family Physicians' Collaborative Research Network, 4 J. AM. BOARD
FAM. PRAC. 327 (1991) (indicating variations in urinary tract infection management in wo-
men); Joann G. Elmore et al., Variability in Radiologists' Interpretations of Mammograms,
331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1493 (1994) (showing variations in interpretation and recommenda-
tions for management between radiologists); Bryan A. Liang et al., Analysis of the Resource-
Based Relative Value Scale for Medicare Reimbursements to Academic and Community Hos-
pital Radiology Departments, 179 RADIOLOGY 751 (1991) (indicating differences in assess-
ment of radiologic work between community hospitals and academic medical centers); Jack E.
Meyer et al., Biopsy of Occult Breast Lesions: Analysis of 1261 Abnormalities, 263 JAMA
2341 (1990) (indicating community-based radiologists may be more aggressive in their recom-
mendations than academic radiologists in the context of suspicious mammograms); John E.
Wennberg & Alan Gittlesohn, Variations in Medical Care Among Small Areas, 246 Sci. AM.
120 (1982) (reviewing variation in assessing indications for prostate, thyroid, or coronary by-
pass surgery). However, none of these studies assessed the consistency of physician assess-
ments over time.
64 This again implies that there may be multiple standards of medical appropriateness.
See Liang, supra note 2, at 91; supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
65 This finding should give some comfort to those physicians and nonphysicians who
anecdotally believe that physician practice is somewhat whimsical where actions are based on
random factors. Although there is a great deal of variation, physicians appear to have a consis-
tent approach, at least independently, in their assessments of medical facts.
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tency may have significant implications for malpractice. If certain
consistent practices and approaches are considered to be definitely negli-
gent, they should be identifiable and thus communicated as such to phy-
sicians in the field and lay agents of the legal system. On the other hand,
if multiple practices and approaches are considered to be within the
scope of reasonable practice, the same consistency should make these
approaches identifiable as nonnegligent to physicians and to lay agents of
the legal system.6 6 However, assuming that it becomes known to the
court, this identification and communication of appropriate and inappro-
priate practice may still not result in an effective and efficient system if
juries use non-legal alternative rules or standards to assess physician be-
havior. Additionally, the system will not be effective in the large number
of cases where no appropriate clinical studies have established one or
more acceptable standards of medical care.67
C. CAN PHYSICIANS ACCURATELY PREDICT JURY VERDICTS?
Recall that if physicians could predict what the results of the tort
system's adjudications would be (regardless of their legal knowledge and
jury judgment standards), and act on the basis of those predictions,
knowledge of the incentive structure's rules, methods, pronouncements,
and factors used in negligence determinations would all be irrelevant, at
least with regard to effective deterrence. However, physicians did not
have good success in predicting jury verdicts overall and in fact dis-
agreed strongly in their assessment of several of the cases. 68 Further, in
the important gray area cases, physicians fared quite poorly in their ef-
forts as compared with the stellar performance of NPNLs who were in-
distinguishable from juries. Thus, even under this less stringent model of
the tort system's deterrence structure, the tort signal appears to be limited
in its effect at least for these physicians. Further, NPNLs once again may
be exhibiting some characteristic that allows them better predictive abil-
ity than physicians, unrelated to legal or medical knowledge.
66 However, identification and communication of these specific practices require much
more work on medical effectiveness. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. Note that the
described method is actually how the legal system in tort is supposed to function. When there
are different schools of thought regarding medical practice, physicians under hornbook law are
to be assessed by the tenets of that school, assuming that there is a "respectable minority"
adhering to that practice. See K~rON ET AL., supra note 5, at 187. Thus, differing methods of
treatment are not to be excluded by juries in their care assessments simply because there is
interphysician disagreement. If they are being so excluded, this represents another departure
of the legal system from its theoretical bases and thus more difficulties that require assessment
in an effort to provide physicians with an efficient and consistent deterrence structure. See
also supra notes 59-60 (describing the concerns regarding expert witnesses and standards of
care).
67 See Meadow et al., supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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This inability to predict jury verdicts is extremely important. If
physicians are not knowledgeable about the malpractice system, diverge
from juries in their case assessments (potentially reflecting the use of
different standards of adjudication), and cannot accurately predict jury
verdicts, then neither the Prosser model nor this alternate model would
appear to apply. If neither model applies, then there is a significant ques-
tion of whether the tort system is providing any consistent and/or useful
signal to physicians regarding what care is appropriate and what care is
not.
D. POTENTIAL INCENTIVES
If the results found in this case study are true on a broader scale, the
wide discordance between what the system assumes and what is actually
true may have significant implications. If physicians have ex ante
knowledge that some of their assessments of medically appropriate care
will concord with jury verdicts and some will not, physicians may be
unable to determine for a specific clinical scenario which care will be
deemed negligent and which care will not. Thus, if physicians are risk
averse, they may overestimate the probability of suit. 69
Similarly, if juries consider other factors in their deliberations re-
garding the negligence or nonnegligence of individual physicians for a
particular case, and return negligent verdicts in some circumstances and
nonnegligent verdicts in others, a highly unclear incentive structure will
result.70 Physicians will have the incentive to provide only care that is
considered by juries, or which they themselves consider "nonnegligent,"
all of the time, resulting in inappropriate levels of care being rendered.
This is the specter of defensive medicine rising again.7 ' Thus, the sys-
tem, purportedly in place to provide incentives for physicians to render
optimal levels of care, may instead give the actors within the system an
incentive to provide either too much or too little care.
It bears noting that there are practical patient care ramifications that
result. On the one hand, physicians may provide excessive levels of care
to patients. This excess of care is not without cost. In addition to the
pecuniary cost of providing such care, it increases the patient's risk of
iatrogenic injury. Indeed, these risks and potential harms from excessive
treatment may not be large enough to counter the defensive medicine
tendencies if the primary disease state to be diagnosed or treated is very
serious (e.g., cancer), whereas the potential loss from the excess treat-
69 Physicians have been reported to overestimate the likelihood of suit by a factor of
three. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRAC-ICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MAL-
PRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 124 (1993).
70 See Liang, supra note 2, at 77.
71 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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ment is relatively small. On the other hand, physicians may fail to pro-
vide necessary but risky treatment. This form of defensive medicine is
also not without cost; patients who require this care will suffer harm due
to their inability to access such care because physicians acting under an
uncertain legal system are attempting to avoid liability. Thus, although
physicians may be affected by the tort system in some fashion, the actual
circumstances may in fact result in socially detrimental levels of excess
or insufficient care, rather than the cost-effective, socially beneficial
levels desired. Indeed, the malpractice system, which theoretically is in
place to minimize the risk of patient injury, may instead paradoxically
increase that risk in its current operational state.
Finally, due to potentially unclear adjudication standards, inconsis-
tent adjudicatory results, and unclear communications between the legal
system and physicians, physicians may simply have no incentive at all to
learn about the deterrence structure. Without the desire to learn or the
ability to predict the system's results, significant departures from the the-
oretical ideal can occur, which could render wasteful the extensive socie-
tal resources allocated to the medical malpractice tort system's
deterrence structure.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Ignorance and incorrect conceptions regarding the standard by
which physicians are being judged alone indicate that the effectiveness of
the medical malpractice incentive structure is questionable. In addition,
divergence of physician and jury assessments, NPNL equal ability to as-
sess cases as physicians, and NPNL superiority in predicting jury ver-
dicts in gray area cases, point to a system whose incentive structure may
be, in reality, very far from its theoretical ideal.
If these case study findings are generally applicable, remedying this
situation is problematic. Assuming that jury verdict cases were avail-
able, published, and easily accessible (and that physicians had time to
read and understand them), the divergence of physician assessments of
jury verdict cases (due to differences in the application of the medical
appropriateness standard, lack of understanding of that standard, juries
using other factors alone or in combination with the legal standard, or
other reasons) would still render the case decisions, or even knowledge
of the legal rule, of little assistance in "teaching" physicians what consti-
tutes socially acceptable, nonnegligent care.
Alternatively, knowledge of the legal communicatory mode, and the
potential "teaching" and "learning" thereof, will not compensate for phy-
sicians' lack of knowledge of the legal standard, nor for the practical
difficulties of gaining access to these decisions, even assuming consistent
adjudication and strict (and sole) application of the legal rule to the case
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by juries. However, without knowledge, assessment consistency, or ac-
cess, there are significant impediments to making the medical malprac-
tice tort system the theoretically effective and efficient incentive
structure it is often assumed to be.
In addition, beyond these factors, cultural differences in communi-
cation, education, and approach between the medical and legal profes-
sions may make any effort to use the structure and concomitant results of
one (the law) to "dictate" the acceptable behavior of members within the
other (physicians) an extremely challenging endeavor. Indeed, the legiti-
macy to physicians of a legal conclusion defining appropriate medical
care may be limited. Thus, utilization of findings such as intertemporal
consistency of physician assessments of clinical scenarios may be better
able to change physician behavior since these practices and approaches
emanate from the medical profession itself.72 However, even using these
techniques and assuming that the legal system will continue to be the
final arbiter of malpractice claims and disputes, a binary liable/not liable
approach may simply not be appropriate to a field such as medicine
where there is no bright line rule in the ever changing gray of daily
practice.
There is much to be learned about physician and jury behavior to
bring to fruition the goal of appropriate and efficient deterrence in the
health care system. This case study has attempted to contribute to that
effort. Of course, there are significant limitations to the assessment done
here. Although the results obtained are consistent with other work in the
field, this is a case study of a single anesthesiology department with a
small number of homogeneous academic physicians; thus, its results are
only suggestive and its discussion and interpretations may have limited
applicability. Indeed, its primary contribution is to assist in identifying
and verifying issues that need further attention when researching the im-
portant question of medical malpractice and the system's efforts at
72 This is the hope of clinical practice guidelines for medical care. Clinical practice
guidelines are systematically developed guides to practice for particular clinical situations.
See Deborah W. Hong & Bryan A. Liang, The Scope of Clinical Practice Guidelines, Hosp.
PHYsicLAN, May 1996, at 46. However, clinical practice guidelines as a source of a legal
standard of care are weak. First, clinical guidelines reflect only one perspective as to the
medically appropriate action in a specific clinical scenario. As seen here and noted above,
there is significant variation as to medical practice that does not reflect inappropriate care. See
supra notes 62-63. Second, clinical practice guidelines are not all developed using rigorous,
double blind studies; informal consensus, formal consensus, and other approaches are also
used. See Hong & Liang, supra, at 46-47. In addition, the relevance of guidelines may be
inappropriate to community and other practitioners due to the source that guidelines emanate
from (e.g., a medical specialty society or academic medical center). See id. at 48-49. Finally,
clinical practice guidelines are not simply evidence-based, scientific pronouncements that
leave little room for debate. These guidelines reflect the value judgments of those who partici-
pated in their formulation, including physicians and patients. See id. at 49.
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changing physician behavior. However, these empirical efforts need to
be continued. It is imperative that:
in order to effectively examine the tort system and to
assess its impact on physician behavior, researchers [ ]
build on empirical determinations of how actors in the
system actually perform-rather than assert as self-evi-
dent, or hope with childlike simplicity, that their funda-
mental assumptions regarding the medical malpractice
system are true.73
Thus, because "[t]he role of the malpractice system as a deterrent
against too little or poor-quality care-one of its intended purposes-has
not been carefully studied," 74 an empirical analysis of additional physi-
cians, specialties, and clinical circumstances using physician accessible
materials is necessary to assess the assumptions of the current medical
malpractice incentive system and its ex ante impact on physician behav-
ior. In this fashion, development of a more thorough understanding of
the workings of the legal system may emerge and provide the potential to
fulfill the social goal of the medical malpractice tort system: to furnish
an effective incentive structure which results in maximum patient benefit
and minimal patient harm in a world of limited social resources.
73 Liang, supra note 2, at 93.
74 OFIcE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, DFENSWVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE, supra note 39, at 2.
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APPENDIX 1. PART I SURVEY QUESTIONS
NEGLIGENCE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
THE KNOWLEDGE BASE OF PHYSICIANS OF
THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE ABILITY
TO DIFFERENTIATE NEGLIGENT CARE
1. How many years are you post residency/fellowship?
2. Do you have an academic title and if so, what is it?
3. Are you Board Certified?
4. Is there a formal program here about law or legal issues?
5. Have you ever been an expert witness?
6. Where do you get information about malpractice?
7. What is the definition of "negligence"?
8. Do you have any legal background (e.g., degree in law, previous
study of law, spouse/relative in law)?
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JURY VERDICTS
APPENDIX 2. JuRY VERDICT CASES'
FACTS: 2/17/89: Plaintiff, a 42 year-old nurse, was admitted to [Hospi-
tal] to undergo a lumbar laminectomy. [Defendant] was the anesthesiol-
ogist and met the Plaintiff for the first time 1/2 hour prior to the
scheduled surgery. In the course of preparing the patient for anesthesia,
[Defendant] attempted to start an IV in the Plaintiff's left wrist area. Im-
mediately upon insertion of the needle, the Plaintiff felt tingling and pain.
[Defendant] discontinued the IV attempt and switched to inside of elbow
of Plaintiff's right arm.
PLAINTIFF claimed [Defendant] hit the median nerve, and to do so,
[Defendant] would have had to place the needle deep into the wrist. [De-
fendant] was hurried and did not exhibit care in attempting to place the
IV needle. The Plaintiff was cold and should have been warmed up prior
to attempting to place the IV. The IV should not have been attempted at
the left wrist but that another more appropriate site such as the forearm
or back of hand should have been utilized.
DEFENDANT argued his treatment did not violate the standard of care.
Nerve injury is a risk anytime one attempts to place an IV. [Defendant]
did not violate the standard of care. The standard does not require warm-
ing of the patient if one can find an appropriate IV site. [Defendant]
acknowledged that the wrist area was not a location of first choice but it
was an adequate location and one routinely utilized by anesthesiologists.
He did not hit the median nerve but rather a superficial branch of the
median nerve.
1 The actual jury verdict cases are reproduced in the following pages. The cases were
sent to the surveyed physicians twice. The first time they were sent, the following appeared at
the end- of each case:
CIRCLE ONE:
Negligent Most Likely Can't Tell* Most Likely Not Negligent
Negligent Not Negligent
5 4 3 2 1
*Please indicate why:
In the surveys sent to the physicians the second time, and in the surveys sent to the NPNLs, the
order of the cases was reversed, and each case was followed by the following:
CIRCLE ONE:
Negligent Most Likely Can't Tell* Most Likely Not Negligent
Negligent Not Negligent
5 4 3 2 1
*Please indicate why:
What do you think the jury found (circle one): Guilty
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FACTS: 4-89: Plaintiff, a 69 year old retired man, was seen by defend-
ants in April and May 1989 for treatment of shingles. On 4-12-89 plain-
tiff was admitted to defendant [Hospital] by defendant Dr. A. During
admission defendant Dr. C, defendant anesthesiologist, inserted an in-
dwelling epidural catheter at T-7 for management of plaintiff's intracta-
ble pain. Plaintiff was seen at defendant hospital emergency room over
the next two weeks for injections through the catheter for pain manage-
ment. The week following the initial insertion, the catheter came out and
a new catheter was reinserted in the same space by defendant Dr. C.
Plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital on 4-24-89 by Dr. A for treatment
of fever, vomiting and dehydration. WBC count was 24,000. Plaintiff's.
epidural catheter was removed and Dr. C performed cryorhizotomy on 4-
26. Plaintiff was discharged the next day with WBC count of 19,000.
Six weeks later plaintiff became acutely paraplegic due to spinal collapse
at T-7 secondary to osteomyelitis.
PLAINTIFF contends Defendants failed to diagnose and treat epidural
space infection caused by the insertion of the epidural catheter at T-7
which led to osteomyelitis at same level. Defendants should have or-
dered blood cultures, CT scans and other diagnostic tests to determine
cause of elevated WBC count.
DEFENSE claimed no negligence in their care and treatment. Elevated
WBC count was secondary to administration of steroids to treat shingles.
Osteomyelitis was not seeded by epidural catheter although exact cause
is unknown.
FACTS: Plaintiff, a 21 year old woman cashier, was taken to defendant
[Medical Center] to deliver her term baby. She was given a trial of labor,
but it was decided by her OB/GYN, defendant Dr. H, that she would
undergo an emergency C-section because of CPD. Defendant Dr. S was
the anesthesiologist. About half way through the procedure it was evi-
dent that plaintiff was losing an excessive amount of blood and the pre-
liminary work for a transfusion was ordered. The procedure was
complicated by uterine atony (a failure of the uterus to contract after
delivery), which allowed for a continuation of the abnormal blood loss.
Finally the administration of Pitocin and Methergine controlled the
bleeding. The best estimate is that plaintiff lost between 1,800 and 2,500
ccs. of blood which was inadequately replaced by 2,300 cc's of Crystal-
loid with no blood transfusion. Plaintiff was then transferred across the
hall to the recovery room with a B/P of 137/97 and pulse rate of 135.
Defendant Dr. S, who had accompanied plaintiff to the recovery room,
left within five minutes and Nurse was alone with plaintiff. Within 7 - 8
minutes of her arrival in the recovery room, plaintiff sat up and began
wheezing and gasping for breath. Nurse called for help and both defend-
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ant Dr. S and defendant Dr. H came to the recovery room. Plaintiff was
placed in a semisitting position and given a broncho dilator by defendant
Dr. S. Plaintiff was then returned to a reclining position where she imme-
diately suffered a respiratory arrest. The "code blue" team was then
called. Defendant Dr. S attempted to intubate the plaintiff at that point,
but was not provided with a properly functioning laryngoscope from the
recovery room "crash cart". After an approximate 2 - 4 minute delay, the
proper equipment was provided and the intubation was completed. By
that time, the plaintiff had suffered a cardiac arrest. Resuscitation was
continued and plaintiff's vital signs returned, but she was in a deep coma.
Upon awakening from the coma, it was evident that she had suffered
neurological deficits.
PLAINTIFF contends that defendants failure to properly monitor her
while in critical condition and failure to replace and maintain equipment
available in recovery room led to her injury.
DEFENDANT contended there was no breach of standard of practice
and no causation since plaintiff suffered an amniotic fluid embolus which
resulted in respiratory and then cardiac arrest. Defendant Dr. S also
claimed that defendant Dr. H was negligent in the amount of Pitocin
given and that this had caused the amniotic fluid embolus.
FACTS: On May 23, 1989, a 30-year-old registered nurse was given an
epidural anesthetic while she was in labor. Forty minutes later, severe
fetal distress was noted on the fetal monitor. The obstetrician ordered a
crash cesarean section. Through an existing epidural catheter-, another
faster acting anesthetic was added, and the cesarean section incision was
made two minutes later. Shortly after delivering the child, the mother
vomited, was short of breath, and seized. She was intubated and venti-
lated but went into a full arrest. Closed chest compression was started.
Within four minutes, blood pressure and heart rate were restored, but the
mother incurred brain damage. The child was born severely depressed,
but was successfully resuscitated and is healthy.
PLAINTIFF contended that the anesthesiologist inadvertently gave a
high spinal through a migrated epidural catheter. It was further alleged
that CPR and chest compressions iwere not instituted soon enough, and
that earlier CPR would have resulted in a complete recovery. Finally,
plaintiff contended that a general anesthetic should have been given.
DEFENDANT position was that plaintiff was injured by an amniotic
fluid embolism, which is unpredictable, unpreventable and untreatable.
FACTS: On March 31, 1985, a 28-year-old woman presented to the
emergency room of [Hospital]. She was 28 weeks pregnant, and she
complained of abdominal pain. She was assessed by an obstetrical nurse
and an obstetrician, who diagnosed severe placental abruption and fetal
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distress. The obstetrician ordered an emergency cesarean section. De-
fendant-anesthesiologist and another obstetrician were performing an
emergency cesarean section at the time. They were notified of plaintiff's
situation and responded immediately. Defendant-anesthesiologist and the
other obstetrician examined the patient briefly. She was in shock. The
patient was taken to the operating room where the child was delivered by
emergency cesarean section. Following the delivery, and while the uterus
was being closed, the patient had a cardiac arrest.
PLAINTIFF contended that the anesthesiologist should have started a
second IV line and administered additional fluids, including blood, prior
to the induction of anesthesia. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendant
should have used Ketamine instead of Thiopental for the induction of
anesthesia and that a combination of the inadequate fluids and Thiopental
caused asphyxia to the fetus and cardiac arrest.
DEFENDANT contended that since the obstetricians ordered an emer-
gency cesarean section, there was not enough time to start a second IV
line, and Ketamine was not available on the anesthesia craftsman in
either operating room. Under the circumstances, it was appropriate to
give the patient a reduced dose of Thiopental, defendant contended.
Neither the fluid resuscitation nor the Thiopental caused asphyxia to the
fetus or the cardiac arrest, defendant argued.
FACTS: On January 20, 1986, a pregnant woman received an epidural
block during the delivery of her child, and was left paraplegic. On Janu-
ary 18, 1986, a 21-year-old secretary went to the hospital to deliver her
second child. On the morning of January 20, anesthesia was provided by
the placement of an epidural block and the administration of drugs by a
continuous lumbar epidural catheter. During the procedure, plaintiff
complained of a severe shock-like sensation, which caused her arms and
legs to shoot out, and of burning pain in her legs. The procedure was
continued and the anesthetic drug was injected. Additional drugs were
injected three separate times. The child was delivered by cesarean sec-
tion. Plaintiff was left permanently paraplegic in her lower extremities. A
medical malpractice action was brought against the anesthesiologist and
against the hospital.
PLAINTIFF alleged that an injury to the spinal cord or the spinal cord's
blood supply was caused by the placement of the epidural needle or the
catheter and that defendants negligently failed to identify and treat the
resulting harm for 24 hours. Plaintiff contended that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applied.
DEFENDANTS argued that plaintiff had a low lying spinal cord, that
spinal cord ischemia was unrelated to the placement of the epidural nee-
dle or catheter, that it was impossible for the needle to reach the spinal
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cord, that it was impossible for the catheter to cause trauma to the spinal
cord, and that the injury was an unpreventable vascular accident.
FACTS: On July 14, 1983, a retired sheet metal worker entered the hos-
pital for an operation to repair a small umbilical hernia and to remove a
small growth from his lip. The defendant anesthesiologist elected to per-
form spinal anesthesia. During the operation, the patient was placed in a
Trendelenburg position (head down and feet up), which allowed the level
of spinal anesthesia to reach C7. The patient's blood pressure dropped
fifty percent. No oxygen or other treatment was given during the proce-
dure. As a result, the patient suffered from ischemia to the tip of his
spinal cord.
PLAINTIFF alleged that the anesthesia was mismanaged in that the spi-
nal reached the level of C7, resulting in a dramatic drop in blood pres-
sure. This went untreated both during and after the operation. As a result,
there was a lack of blood supply to the conus medularis, causing perma-
nent damage to the S2 and S3 nerve roots.
DEFENDANTS argued that the injury to the spine occurred on the ward
in an episode where plaintiff's blood pressure was recorded as 220/120.
It was also suggested that plaintiff's excessive alcohol consumption and
life-long cigarette smoking contributed to the result.
FACTS: A 78-year-old retired man suffered severe brain damage while
recovering from coronary artery triple bypass surgery. On January 17,
1984, a thoracic surgeon, defendant anesthesiologist and cardiologist per-
formed triple bypass surgery on plaintiff. During the immediate postop-
erative period, plaintiff showed appropriate signs of arousal from the
anesthesia. However, he also experienced profound hypotension during
which he was sometimes anemic and hypovolemic. Fourteen hours after
surgery plaintiff was placed on a ventilator at the direction of the defend-
ant anesthesiologist. Prior to the this plaintiff had been breathing unas-
sisted on 70% oxygen. The anesthesiologist ordered the inspired oxygen
concentration to be reduced from 70% to 50%. Immediately before plain-
tiff was placed on the ventilator his P02 was 59, but after an hour on the
ventilator plaintiff's P02 fell to 52. The surgeon was notified of the drop.
When the surgeon corrected the oxygen concentration by increasing it to
its former level, the P02 values improved.
PLAINTIFF alleged that the defendants should have made postoperative
correction of plaintiff's metabolic acidosis, evolving respiratory acidosis
and anemia. The first postoperative x-ray demonstrated marked
atelectasis. In light of this result defendants allegedly failed to meet the
standard of care which would have required the patient to be placed on a
ventilator immediately after surgery. Defendant anesthesiologist's reant-
anesthesiologist argued that the standard of care did not require placing
1997]
154 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
plaintiff on a ventilator. In addition, defendant's clinical judgment to re-
duce the inspired oxygen concentration from 70% to 50% was medically
justified by the presence of the absorption atelectasis phenomena. De-
fendant contended that plaintiff's respiratory status did not impair heart
function or circulatory status and did not produce the periods of apnea or
cardiac arrhythmias which plaintiff suffered. Defendant further DE-
FENDANT-anesthesiologist argued that the standard of care did not re-
quire placing plaintiff on a ventilator. In addition, defendant's clinical
judgment to reduce the inspired oxygen concentration from 70% to 50%
was medically justified by the presence of the absorption atelectasis phe-
nomena. Defendant contended that plaintiff's respiratory status did not
impair heart function or circulatory status and did not produce the peri-
ods of apnea or cardiac arrhythmias which plaintiff suffered. Defendant
further contended that plaintiff's brain damage resulted from "post pump
encephalopathy."
FACTS: On December 24, 1983, Plaintiff was admitted to the [Medical
Center] with a diagnosis of acute cholecystitis and peritoneal symptoms,
requiring immediate surgery for total cholecystectomy (removal of gall
bladder). Upon induction of anesthesia by defendant anesthesiologist, the
Plaintiff vomited, aspirated his gastric contents and developed a condi-
tion known as aspiration pneumonia. It was alleged that Plaintiff, a phy-
sician, repeatedly informed the doctors and staff that he had ingested
foods and beverages prior to entering the emergency room.
PLAINTIFF contended and that defendant anesthesiologist was negligent
in the administration of anesthesia in that: (1) he failed to administer
medication designed to help empty the patient's stomach and alter the
acidity level of its contents; (2) the intubation of the patient, which is
usually done with the patient awake, was attempted while the patient was
asleep, causing him to aspirate his vomit; (3) defendant did not keep the
patient in a semi-elevated position but, instead, allowed him to lie fiat on
his back; and (4) defendant should have attempted the Sillich maneuver
upon anesthesia induction to prevent the reflux of stomach contents into
the pharynx.
DEFENDANT anesthesiologist argued that he had used routine proce-
dures for the induction of general anesthesia to a heart patient. While an
awake intubation and the use of the Sillich maneuver are proper in the
normal patient, in the case of a heart patientsuch procedures are contra-
indicated as they could lead to a heart attack.
FACTS: On October 24, 1984, a 24 year old male plaintiff was admitted
into the [Hospital] for minor outpatient surgery to effect the removal of
hardware which had previously been placed in his ankle as treatment for
a fracture. Plaintiff was placed under general anesthesia by defendant
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anesthesiologist and approximately 10 minutes later, defendant noted
PVCs on the heart monitor. According to defendant's testimony, he de-
termined that the anesthesia mask was tightly fitted around plaintiff's
nose and mouth, that the plaintiff's lips had good color and showed no
sign of turning blue, and that appropirate resistance was achieved on
squeezing the air bag, all of which led defendant to conclude that plain-
tiff was receiving adequate oxygenation and ventilation. Defendant then
administered Lidocaine in an attempt to restore a normal heart beat. The
PVCs continued and defendant administered a second injection of Lido-
caine approximately 4 minutes after the first injection. Immediately
thereafter, plaintiff went into ventricular tachycardia and then cardiac
arrest. Plaintiff was intubated, CPR was started, and plaintiff was re-
vived. The plaintiff received 100% oxygen for several miniutes before
arterial blood gases were taken, which indicated an abnormally low oxy-
gen level and extremely high C02 level. The evidence indicated that
aproximately 8-9 minutes passed between the onset of PVCs and resusci-
tation of plaintiff.
PLAINTIFF contended that defendant deviated from the standard of care
in failing to oxygenate and ventilate plaintiff while he was under general
anesthesia and then in failing to recognize clear warning signs of inade-
quate oxygenation and ventilation, thereby causing the plaintiff to suffer
anoxic brain damage and cardiac arrest.
DEFENDANT denied liability and asserted that the plaintiff was pro-
vided with adequate oxygenation and ventilation while under general an-
esthesia and was properly monitored at all times to ensure adequate
oxygenation and ventilation. The defendant contended that the plaintiff's
cardiac arrest was not the result of an anesthesiology oversight but was
caused by one or more of a number of possible alternatives completely
unrelated to the anesthesiology administered.
FACTS: On 11/21/85, a 12 year old male plaintiff was admitted to [Hos-
pital] with a ruptured appendix. He underwent an appendectomy and was
discharged on 11/28/85. On 1/9/86, plaintiff was readmitted through
[Hospital] emergency room with a diagnosis of subacute bowel obstruc-
tion. He was discharged from [Hospital] on 1/12/86, as it was felt that the
obstruction was resolved. On 1/16/86, the plaintiff was readmitted and an
exploratory laparotomy was performed, at which time it was determined
that the plaintiff's entire bowel was irritated. At the close of surgery, the
defendant anesthesiologist introduced an internal jugular catheter to be
used as a hyperalimentation line through which the patient could receive
nutrition while the bowel recovered. On 1/17/86 and 1/18/86, chest x-
rays were taken which the plaintiff contended were interpreted incor-
rectly by the defendant as showing that the catheter tip was located in the
superior vena cava. On 1/18/86, both films were read by a radiologist
1997]
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who found the catheter to be in the lower right atrium. On 1/21/86, the
infusion rate of TPN fluid through the CVP line was high, resulting in an
infusion of TPN fluid into the pericardial sac surrounding the heart.
PLAINTIFF contended that he suffered a cadiac tamponade, necessitat-
ing an emergency pericardiocentesis to restore the plaintiff's blood pres-
sure and heart rate. The plaintiff maintained that the tip of the catheter
pierced the right atrial wall of his heart, permitting the influx of fluid into
the pericadial sac and that the defendant anesthesiologist deviated from
the standard of care in misplacing the catheter tip into the low right
atrium of the heart. The defendent further misinterpreted the x-ray which
depicted the tip of the catheter in the low right atrium and plaintiff as-
serted that the defendant deviated in failing to timely withdraw the cathe-
ter tip from the heart. Finally, the plaintiff contended that he suffered
trauma to his heart with a resulting depressive episode and post-traumatic
stress disorder as a result of the defendant's negligence.
DEFENDANT asserted that the technique and manner of inserting the
catheter were within the medically accepted standards of care. The de-
fendant further maintained that his performance in inserting the catheter
was not neglgent and that the plaintiff did not suffer any injury as a result
of the defendant's conduct.
FACTS: Plaintiff, 41-year-old male mechanic was disabled from his em-
ployment due to a back injury. Plaintiff underwent a lumbar laminectomy
to treat the condition. After surgery, plaintiff suffered a nerve lesion and
developed right ulnar neuropathy which left him without the use of his
dominant hand. Defendant anesthesiologist provided anesthesia during
the surgery. The plaintiff's case proceeded against the defendant anesthe-
siologist on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
PLAINTIFF contended that the nerve lesion and damage was occasioned
by the defendant's improper positioning of the plaintiff during surgery,
and that ulnar neuropathy, a well-known risk of surgery when performed
in the prone position, was not an acceptable result.
DEFENDANT contended that the plaintiffs injury was not documented
until six days after the surgery, and asserted that the injury could have
occurred after surgery. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff was
already severely disabled from his pre-existing back injury and that he
did not sustain any further lost wages as a result of the injury to his hand.
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TABLE 1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR
PHYSICIANS IN PART I OF THE SURVEY
Source of Factors of
Physician Residency Years of Academic Board Formal Law Info for Negligence Any Lega
# Training Experience Title Certified? Program 
Malpractice (out of 4) g
AA Program B 24 Professor 1 0 Courses, seminars, 3 immediate familyexpert witness roles (X3)
AA2 Program A 6 Assistant inAnesthesia 0 throwaways 1 0
ro3 Associate 1throwaways, Health 2 0
AA3 Program A 33 Professor Affairs
0 (will
AA4 Program A 1.5 Assistant in be taking 0 throwaways 2 0Anesthesia boards)
AA5 Program A 7 Aista 0 literature 1 0Anesthesia
AA6 P C 21 Assistant in 0 risk management 1 0
gram Anesthesia courses
AM P A 5 Assistant in 0 journals, 1 0
A gran Anesthesia newsletters
Associate
AA8 Program A 14 in 1 0 case conferences 2 2
Anesthesia
Assistant in 1 0 10
AA9 Program D 10 Anethesia 0 journals, I seminar 1 0
25 Assistant i 0 law newspaper,
AAI0 Program E Anesthesia journals 2 J.D., LLM.
Instructor risk management 0
AAI1 Program F 23 in 1 0 seminars
Anesthesia




Negligence Definition: 4 Factors: Preexisting duty, Breach of duty, Causation, Damages
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TABLE 2A. PHYSICIAN PART II SURVEY RESULTS-
FIRST AND SECOND ADMINISTRATIONS
Case I-D Second Survey Case 2-D Second Survey
Physician Results-Case 1 Results-Case 2
Agree- IUkert Agree- Likert MD Agree- Liken Agree- Likert MD
ment Value ment Value Prediction ment Value ment Value Prediction
AA] I 2 1 2 1 3 0 4 1
AA2 I I I I 1 0 4 0 4 0
AA3 1 2 a * 0 4 * * *
AA4 3 1 1 1 0 5 0 5 0
AA5 1 2 1 2 1 0 4 0 4 0
AA6 I 2 1 2 1 0 4 0 5 0
AA7 1 2 1 2 1 0 4 0 4 0
AA8 I 1 1 2 1 0 5 0 5 0
AA9 3 1 1 1 0 5 0 5 0
AA10 3 1 1 1 0 4 0 5 0
AA " 1 1 1 2 1 3 0 4 0
Mean 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.60 1.00 0.00 4.09 0.00 4.50 0.10
StandardDeviatin 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.53 0.32
Agreement With Jury: 0=No l=Yes; comparing 4, 5 or 1, 2 v. Jury Verdict
Liken Scale: 5=Negligent, 4=Most likely negligent, 3=Can't Tell, 2=Most likely not negligent, l=Not negligent
•AA3 did not return the second survey.
TABLE 2B. PHYSICIAN PART II SURVEY RESULTS-
FIRST AND SECOND ADMINISTRATIONS
Case 3-P Second Survey Case 4-D Second Survey
Physician Results-Case 3 Results-Case 4
Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD
menit Value ment Value Prediction ment Value ment Value Prediction
AAI 1 5 1 5 1 0 4 0 4 0
AA2 3 1 4 1 3 1 2 1
AA3 1 5 * * * * 3 *
AA4 1 4 1 4 1 1 2 1 2 0
AA5 1 4 1 4 1 1 2 1 2 0
AA6 1 4 1 4 1 I 2 3 1
AA7 3 3 1 3 3 1
AA8 1 5 1 5 1 3 3 1
AA9 I 4 1 5 1 0 5 0 5 0
AAI0 3 0 2 1 3 3 0
AAII 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 1
Mean 1.00 4.00 0.89 4.00 1.00 0.67 2.82 0.67 2.90 0.50
StandardDeviation 0.00 0.77 0.33 0.94 0.00 0.52 1.08 0.52 0.99 0.53
Agreement With Jury: 0=No t=Yes; comparing 4, 5 or 1, 2 v. Jury Verdict
Liken Scale: 5=Negligent, 4=Must likely negligent, 3-Can't Tell, 2-Most likely not negligent, l=Not negligent
•AA3 did not return the second survey.
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Case 5-D Second Survey Case 6-P Second Survey
Physician Results-Case 5 Results-Case 6
Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD
meat Value meat Value Prediction meat Value ment Value Prediction
AAI 1 2 1 2 1 1 4 1 4 1
AA2 1 2 3 0 1 4 0 2 1
AA3 I 2 * 1 5 * *
AA4 1 2 3 0 1 4 1 4 1
AA5 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 1
AA6 0 4 0 4 0 1 5 1 4 1
AA7 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 4 1
AA8 0 4 1 2 1 1 5 1 5 1
AA9 0 4 0 4 0 1 4 3 1
AAI0 3 1 2 0 1 4 1 4 1
AAII 3 1 2 1 1 5 1 4 1
Mean 0.67 2.64 0.75 2.50 0-50 1.00 4.27 0.88 3.70 1.00
StandardDeviation 0.50 1.03 0.46 0.97 0.53 0.00 0.65 0.35 0.82 0.00
Agreement With Juy: 0=No l=Yes; comparing 4, 5 or 1,2 v. Jury Verdict
Likert Scale: 5=Negligent, 4=Most likely negligent, 3--Can't Tell, 2=Most likely not negligent, l=Not negligent
•AA3 did not return the second survey.
TA3LE 2D. PHYSICIAN PART II SURVEy RESULTS-
FIRST AND SECOND ADMINISTRATIONS
Case 7-P Second Survey Case 8-D Second Survey
Physician Results-Case 7 Results-Case 8
Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD
meat Value ment Value Prediction meat Value ment Value Prediction
AAI 1 5 1 5 1 0 4 0 4 1
AA2 1 4 3 0 3 3 0
AA3 1 5 * * 0 4 *
AA4 3 0 2 1 3 0 4 1
AA5 3 1 4 1 0 4 0 4 0
AA6 1 4 1 4 1 0 5 0 4 0
AA7 1 4 3 0 1 2 1 2 1
AA8 1 5 3 1 0 5 0 4 0
AA9 3 1 4 1 0 4 0 5 0
AAIO 1 4 1 4 1 0 4 0 4 0
AAll 1 4 1 2 1 0 4 1 2 0
Mean 1.00 4.00 0.86 3.40 0.80 0.11 3.82 0.22 3.60 0.30
StandardDeviatirn 0.00 0.77 0.38 0.97 0.42 0.33 0.87 0.44 0.97 0.48
Agreement With Jury: 0=No l=Yes; comparing 4, 5 or 1,2 v. Jury Verdict
Likert Scale: 5=Negligent, 4=Most likely negligent, 3=Can't Tell, 2=Most likely not negligent, l=Not negligent
•AA3 did not rem the second survey.
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TABLE 2C. PHYSICrIA PART II SURVEY RESULTS-
FIRST AND SECOND ADMiNISTRATIONS
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TABLE 2E. PHYSICIAN PART II SURVEY RESULTS-
FIRST AND SECOND ADMINISTRATIONS
Case 9-D Second Survey Case 10-P Second Survey
Physician Results-Case 9 Results-Case 10
Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD
ment Value ment Value Prediction ment Value ment Value Prediction
AA1 0 5 0 5 0 1 4 1 5 1
AA2 0 5 0 4 0 1 4 3 1
AA3 3 * * 1 5 * *
AA4 0 5 0 4 I 1 5 1 4 1
AA5 3 0 4 0 1 4 1 4 1
AA6 0 5 0 4 0 1 5 1 5 1
AA7 3 3 1 1 4 1 4 1
AA8 0 5 0 4 0 1 5 3 0
AA9 0 4 0 5 0 1 4 I 5 I
AAI0 0 4 3 1 1 4 1 4 1
AAII 0 5 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 0
Mean 0.00 4.27 0.12 3.80 0.30 0.91 4.18 0.88 3.90 0.80
Standard
Deviation 0.00 0.90 0.35 0.92 0.48 0.30 0.87 0.35 0.99 0.42
Agreement With Jury: 0=No l=Yes; comparing 4, 5 or 1,2 v. Jury Verdict
Likert Scale: 5=Negligent, 4=Most likely negligent, 3--Can't Tell, 2=Most likely not negligent, l=Not negligent
•AA3 did not return the second survey.
TABLE 2F. PHYSICIAN PART II SURVEY RESULTS-
FIRST AND SECOND ADMINISTRATIONS
Case 1 1-D Second Survey Case 12-P Second Survey
Physician Results-Case 11 Results-Case 12
Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD Agree- Likert Agree- Likert MD
ment Value ment Value Prediction ment Value ment Value Prediction
AAI 0 4 0 5 0 0 2 3 0
AA2 0 4 0 4 0 0 2 0 2 0
AA3 I I * 0 2 * *
AA4 0 4 0 5 0 3 1 4 0
AA5 1 2 3 0 0 2 0 2 0
AA6 0 5 0 4 0 I 4 1 4 1
AA7 1 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 0
AA8 0 5 0 4 0 0 2 0 I 0
AA9 0 4 I 2 I 1 4 0 2 0
AA10 0 4 0 4 0 1 4 I 4 1
AAll 1 2 3 I 0 2 0 2 1
Mean 0.36 3.36 0.25 3.60 0.20 0.30 2.64 0.33 2.60 0.30
Station 0.50 1.36 0.46 1.07 0.42 0.48 0.92 0.50 1.07 0.48
Agreement With Jury: 0=No l=Yes; comparing 4, 5 or I 2 v. Jury Verdict
Likert Scale: 5=Negligent, 4=Most likely negligent, 3--Can't Tell, 2=Most likely not negligent, I=Not negligent
• AA3 did not return the second survey.
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TABLE 3. PART II SuRvEY RESULTS-
PHYSICIAN ASSESSMENT AGREEMENT, LIKERT VALUES, AND
PREDICTION VALUES FOR FIRST AND SECOND
ADMImSTRATION
MD Agreement Average Likert Values
Physician # First Survey Second Survey First Survey Second Survey Prediction Average
AAI 0.55 0.55 3.67 4.00 0.67
AA2 0.56 0.38 3.25 2.92 0.42
AA3 0.70 * 3.42 * *
AA4 0.63 0.55 3.58 3.50 0.58
AA5 0.67 0.60 2.92 3.08 0.50
AA6 0.58 0.55 4.08 3.92 0.58
AA7 0.78 0.75 2.83 2.83 0.67
AA8 0.45 0.44 4.17 3.42 0.50
AA9 0.40 0.45 4.00 3.83 0.50
AA10 0.50 0.60 3.67 3.33 0.58
AA11 0.60 0.73 3.00 2.58 0.67
Mean 0.58** 0.56** 3.52*** 3.34*** 0.57****
Standard
Deviation 0.50 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.09
Agreement With Jury: 0=-No 1=Yes; comparing 4, 5 or 1,2 v. Jury Verdict
Likert Scale: 5=Negligent, 4=Most likely negligent, 3=Can't Tell, 2=Most likely not negligent,
l=Not negligent
*AA3 did not return second survey.
**Not significantly different across administrations (by physician, p=0.16); significantly
different from jury verdicts (by physician, first survey, p=0.018; second survey, p--0.021).
***Not significantly different across administrations (by case, p range 0.11-1.00; by physician,
p range 0.21-1.00).
****Significantly different from jury verdicts (over all cases, p<0.001; by physician, p=0.017).
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TABLE 4A. NPNL CASE EVALUATION RESULTS
Case t-D Case 2-D Case 3-P Case 4-D
Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NPNPNL# ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction
NPNLI 3 1 3 1 1 4 1 3 1
NPNL2 1 2 1 0 5 0 1 5 1 1 2 1
NPNL3 0 4 0 0 4 0 1 4 1 1 2 1
NPNLA 0 4 0 0 4 0 1 5 1 1 2 1
NPNL5 0 4 0 0 4 0 1 5 1 1 2 1
NPNL6 1 2 1 0 4 0 1 4 1 3 1
NPNL7 3 1 0 5 0 1 5 1 3 1
NPNL8 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 3 1
NPNL9 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 3 1
NPNL10 1 2 1 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 4 0
NPNL11 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 3 1
NPNL12 1 1 1 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 5 0
Mean 0.70 2.58 0.75 0.27 3.50 0.33 0.83 4.00 0.83 0.67 2.92 0.83
Standard
Deviation 0.48 1.00 0.45 0.47 1.24 0.49 0.39 1.28 0.39 0.52 0.90 0.39
TABLE 4B. NPNL CASE EVALUATION RESULTS
Case 5-D Case 6-P Case 7-P Case 8-D
NPNL# Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NP
ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction
NPNL1 3 1 1 5 1 1 4 1 3 1
NPNL2 1 2 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 3 1
NPNL3 0 4 0 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 1 1
NPNL4 0 4 0 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 2 1
NPNL5 0 4 0 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 1 1
NPNL6 1 2 1 1 5 1 0 2 0 3 1
NPNL7 0 4 0 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 2 1
NPNL8 1 2 1 1 5 1 3 1 3 1
NPNL9 1 2 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 3 1
NPNL1O 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 2 1
NPNLI1 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 0 4 0
NPNL12 1 1 1 1 4 1 0 2 0 0 4 0
Mean 0.64 2.67 0.67 1.00 4.50 1.00 0.82 3.83 0.83 0.71 2.58 0.83
Deviard 050 1.07 0.9 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.40 1.03 0.39 0.49 1.00 0.39
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TABLE 4C. NPNL CASE EVALUATION RESULTS
Case 9-D Case 10-P Case 11-D Case 12-P
Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NP Agree- Likert NPNPNL# ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction ment Value Prediction
NPNL1 1 2 1 1 4 1 3 1 0 2 0
NPNL2 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
NPNL3 0 5 0 1 4 1 0 4 0 1 2 0
NPNL4 0 4 0 1 5 1 0 4 0 0 2 0
NPNL5 0 5 0 1 5 1 0 4 0 0 2 0
NPNL6 0 4 0 1 5 1 0 4 0 0 1 0
NPNL7 0 5 0 1 4 1 0 5 0 3 1
NPNL8 1 5 1 3 1 0 4 0 3 0
NPNL9 0 4 0 1 5 1 3 1 3 1
NPNLIO 1 4 1 0 2 0 0 4 0 1 2 1
NPNL11 0 4 0 1 4 1 3 1 0 2 0
NPNL12 0 4 0 1 5 1 0 5 0 0 1 0
Mean 0.25 4.25 0.25 0.82 3.92 0.83 0.00 4.00 0.25 0.22 2.00 0.25
StandardDeviation 0.45 0.87 0.45 0.40 1.31 0.39 0.00 0.74 0.45 0.44 0.74 0.45
TABLE 5. NPNL AssESsMENT AGREEMENT VALUES,
LIKERT VALUES, AND PREDICTION VALUES
Agreement Likert Prediction
NPNL # Average Average Average
NP1 0.83 3.25 0.92
NP2 0.55 3.42 0.58
NP3 0.58 3.50 0.50
NP4 0.50 3.67 0.50
NP5 0.50 3.67 0.50
NP6 0.50 3.25 0.58
NP7 0.56 4.08 0.67
NP8 0.86 3.25 0.83
NP9 0.88 3.42 0.92
NP10 0.58 3.00 0.58
NP11 0.70 3.17 0.75
NP12 0.33 3.08 0.33
Mean 0.59* 3.40 0.64**
Standard
Deviation 0.49 0.30 0.48
Agreement With Jury: 0=-No l=Yes; comparing 4, 5 or 1,2 v. Jury Verdict
Likert Scale: 5=Negligent, 4=Most likely negligent, 3--Can't Tell, 2=Most likely not negligent,
1=Not negligent
*Significantiy different from jury verdicts (by NPNLs, p--0.014).
**Significantly different from jury verdicts (by NPNLs, p--0.025).
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TABLE 6. PHYSICIAN AND NPNL









Significantly different from jury verdicts, p<0.001.
b Not significantly different from jury verdicts, p--0.37.
Significantly different, p=0.003.
